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A photograph of Camp Concordia, ca. 1945, taken from the camp’s water tower. 
 
If someone in 1944 travelled just two and a half miles northeast of the town of Concordia 
in rural north-central Kansas, up to the junction of the Chicago Burlington & Quincy, the Union 
Pacific, and the Missouri Pacific railroads, a gated compound would have come into view against 
a backdrop of the high, rolling plains. Meticulously landscaped with trees and flowerbeds, the 
visitor would have discovered that this well-tended community contained amenities like libraries, 
athletic fields, movie theaters, and dance halls within its high, fenced-in walls. On any given day, 
the sounds of an orchestra, choir, or theater troop rehearsal might be overheard drifting through 
the air. A steady stream of young men, carrying folding chairs and armloads of books, walked 
from building to building throughout the compound, and groups could regularly be spotted 
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hiking or painting in the surrounding countryside. The compound would have appeared entirely 
self-sufficient, with rows of communal housing, a hospital, a store, and dining facilities.  A 
visitor surely would have wondered about the scene described above. What exactly was this 
place doing there? Was it a boarding school? A selective institution of higher learning, perhaps? 
Anyone from the local area, however, would have known the purpose of the small, square towers 
located at regular intervals along the perimeter of the compound, equipped with machine guns 
and sirens. The locals knew that the inhabitants of the compound were not there of their own free 
will. These men were German prisoners of war, and this was a prison camp.  
 The history of Camp Concordia stands in stark contrast to the average prisoner of war 
camp. Indeed, descriptions of the pitiful conditions in many Japanese internment camps from the 
same period bear no resemblance to the relative luxuries and freedoms enjoyed at this German 
camp. This discrepancy existed for one primary reason. The United States Government believed 
it was possible to ‘re-educate’ German soldiers.  They believed that the Germans could be 
disabused of their harmful Nazi ideology and converted to modern American, democratic values.  
On the eve of Europe’s greatest realignment of power in the twentieth century, policy makers 
saw great potential in crafting a strong, stable, pro-American Germany.  Re-education would be 
the key. 
Even before entering the war, the U.S. government anticipated the need for POW camps 
for captured crews of enemy ships and U-boats. The first mass influx of prisoners came shortly 
after the defeat of Rommel’s Afrika Korps in May of 1943, resulting in 130,000 POWs arriving 
on American soil by August of that year. These first arrivals would be followed by an additional 
200,000 more POWs within the next 12 months, coming from battlefields across Europe as 
Allied commanding officers struggled to feed, house, and secure the growing number of 
3 
 
prisoners.1 The number of the POWs quickly exceeded expectations and, by the time the United 
States stopped accepting new prisoners in May of 1945, there were more than 600 camps spread 
throughout 45 of the 48 states.2 In total, the U.S. government accepted 425,871 Axis prisoners, 
of which 371,683 were German.3 The United States had never had so many prisoners.  In fact, 
never in the history of modern warfare had so many prisoners of war been evacuated over such 
great distances for internment on foreign soil.4  
By 1944, there were 195,000 Kansans serving in the U.S. forces.5 Consequently, Kansas’ 
agriculturally-based economy was hit hard by labor and food shortages.  In April 1943, a Kansas 
newspaper described how a farm deferment program had recently become available. Officials 
warned, however, that a worsening in the Allied military situation could likely result in men who 
were deferred for farm work being called to the service, in which case food production would 
“inevitably suffer.”6 So when Camp Concordia—the first of sixteen camps to be built in 
Kansas—was activated on May 1, 1943, it is not surprising that many local farmers took 
advantage of the arriving POWs as farm laborers.7  
Although the POW influx was unprecedented, American policy makers had rough 
guidelines for such a massive undertaking. Section III of the 1929 Geneva Conventions 
anticipated the future application of a labor program and carefully outlined its specifications. The 
                                                          
1 Gansberg, Judith M. Stalag, U.S.A.: The Remarkable Story of German POWs in America. New York: Crowell, 
1977, p. 11-13. With the anticipated surrender of Italy in 1943, the War Department had no way of guessing how 
many prisoners would arrive in the U.S. Estimates ran as high as 500,000. 
2 May, Lowell A. Camp Concordia: German POWs in the Midwest. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1995. 
3 Gansberg, Stalag, p. 13. 
4 Speakman, Cummins E. Re-education of German Prisoners of War in the United States during World War II. 
Master's thesis, 1948, 2. Speakman was a former officer-in-charge of the re-education programs. 
5 May, Lowell A., and Mark P. Schock. Prisoners of War in Kansas, 1943-1946. Manhattan, KS: KS Publishing, 
2007,p. 11. 
6 "Find Food Picture Brighter." Iola Register (Iola, Kansas), April 17, 1943. 
7 Heinkel, Robert B., Cpt. C.M.P., Prisoner of War Division. “Inspection Report on Prisoner of War Camp, 
Concordia Kansas.” 23 December 1943. National Archives, College Park, Md. Record Group 389. 
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Conventions detailed how much prisoners should be paid, what types of duties they could be 
assigned, and standards for their overall conditions and treatment.  Since the Conventions had 
never before been put into action, their application had to be “tested at every step.”8 
One such test was conducted at Camp Concordia.  The camp possessed 640 acres of land 
designed to contain housing, mess facilities, recreation, and hospitalization for 1000 officer 
POWs and 3000 enlisted POWs.9 The details of the Geneva Conventions’ farm labor program 
applied only to the enlisted men at Camp Concordia and provided for only the voluntary labor of 
officer POWs. Not surprisingly, very few officers volunteered for anything other than 
administrative duties.10  Concordia’s officer population continuously expanded, in the latter half 
of its existence more than doubling, the enlisted soldier population. Because officers could not be 
forced to work, this imbalance often left the majority of the camp’s population idle.11  
To exacerbate the problem, POWs at Concordia arrived shortly after capture and before 
intensive interrogation. As a consequence, a small number of hardcore Nazi idealogues began to 
intimidate the mass of POWs, who, although patriotic Germans, were unsympathetic to 
fascism.12 This quickly became a problem. A December 1943 inspection report noted that “the 
prisoners were running their own companies with no American officer assigned to any company. 
Most disciplinary action and company administrative policy was handled by prisoners 
                                                          
8 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners p. 2. 
9 Teufel, Carl C., ed. The History of Camp Concordia from Site Survey to Deactivation, 1945. National Archives, 
College Park, Md. Record Group 389, Box 1612, np. 
10 May and Schock, Prisoners of War in Kansas, p. 8. 
11 May, Camp Concordia, 106.  The first month the camp was open in August of 1943, there were 702 enlisted and 
90 officers, but the ratio of enlisted soldiers to officers shifted dramatically throughout the course of Camp 
Concordia’s existence. The total population at the camp peaked in November of 1943 with 3012 enlisted and 1015 
officers, and by September of 1945 the numbers were 309 enlisted and 1534 officer. The maximum number of 
officers in the camp topped out at 1893 in November of 1944.  
12 O'Brien, Patrick G., Thomas D. Isern, and R. Daniel. Lumley. Stalag Sunflower: German Prisoners of War in 
Kansas. Topeka, Kan.: Kansas State Historical Society, 1984, p. 184. 
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themselves.”13 The Geneva Conventions specified that the most senior POW officer present in 
the camp would be designated the camp spokesman. This prevented any American participation 
in the selection process and led to the observation of one reporter that the leadership at 
Concordia was “completely Nazi in character.”14  
One serious result was a series of mysterious deaths that occurred in the camp during the 
fall of 1943. Originally deemed suicides, it was later discovered that the victims had expressed 
anti-Nazi sentiments and in some cases had already received threats from Nazi sympathizers in 
the camp.  One such incident is described by a columnist as follows: 
  
Captain Felix Tropschuh, 30, suspected by fellow prisoners of giving information 
concerning a planned escape; Gestapo agents also found in his diary hatred of Nazi ideology; he 
was therefore “tried” by a Nazi ‘court of honor” and expelled from the “German community of 
fellowship;” he was therefore given a rope and at night Nazis posted themselves outside his door 
until he hanged himself on October 18, [1943].  Camp Concordia, Kansas.15 
 
This type of problem was persistent at camps all over America. It was estimated that 
roughly 25% of camp prisoners were fanatical Nazis, 15% anti-Nazi, and 60% somewhere in 
between. At the start of the war, vocal anti-Nazis were separated from the others for their own 
protection, leaving the fanatical Nazis with the majority of the population.16 Dedicated Nazis 
were quick to organize in the camps, and any German prisoner who showed interest in 
democracy or appeared unsympathetic to Nazi ideals ran the risk of retribution from his fellow 
prisoners.17 Anton Kuehmoser, an Afrika Korps POW interned at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 
                                                          
13 Heinkel, “Inspection Report.”  
14 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
15 Fay, Sidney B. "German Prisoners of War: A Suggestion for the Proper Treatment of War Prisoners." Current 
History 8, no. 43 (March 1945), p. 196. 
16 Fiedler, David. The Enemy among Us: POWs in Missouri during World War II. St. Louis: Missouri Historical 
Society Press, 2003, p. 42. 
17 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p. 15 -16 
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recalled a prisoner who had been stabbed to death by another prisoner, a member of the SS. 
“Even in the camp here, we had Nazi rules. Some of the Nazis forced everyone to gather for an 
evening every other week for indoctrination. Anyone who skipped got a warning the first time. 
The second time, he got a visit from ‘the Holy Ghost,’” an SS executioner.”18 
The extent of the German POW influx in 1943 presented the U.S. with a number of 
additional challenges. In the whirlwind of building camps and organizing prisoners, Camp 
Concordia and the rest of the POW camps were left scrambling to figure out how to negotiate 
Nazi/anti-Nazi tensions. Especially at Camp Concordia where the majority of the POW 
population were officers, it was immediately obvious to everyone that all POWs needed to be 
engaged in some constructive activity.19 
In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the government’s original policy had been 
to care for the POWs and utilize their labor in relieving the manpower shortage. At first, there 
was no attempt to change prisoner attitudes or re-educate them in any way.20 However, a steady 
stream of press coverage detailing Nazi atrocities, murders, and forced suicides began to gain the 
attention of the public. What began as a war to support Britain became, in the minds of the 
Americans at large, a war of ideologies.21 Although Americans were fairly assured that 
democracy would prevail, many people were increasingly concerned about the after-effects of 
the war on Nazi Germany. Although stateside feelings towards the Germans were mixed, some 
portion of the American population identified with the regular German draftees as fellow victims 
of the Nazis.  
                                                          
18 Fielder, The Enemy among Us, p. 43. 
19 Wahl, Richard W. “Camp Concordia Prisoner of War University.” Np. 
20 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p.  4. 
21 Nazi Prisoners of War, p. 189. 
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Historian Arnold Krammer noted that, “After so great a struggle, it seemed unthinkable 
to most Americans that the enemy’s Nazi ideology might remain unaltered and its population 
unrepentant.”22 In order to avoid this outcome, journalists, radio commentators, professors, and 
politicians alike began advocating re-education.23 Curt Bondy, professor at the College of 
William and Mary, wrote for the Harvard Educational Review in early 1944, “If we understand 
that education is the building up of character, providing a philosophy of life, and forming a 
certain attitude, then re-education is the attempt to offer new hope, new ideas, new faith, and new 
values, and to have them accepted.”24  
A July 1944 Washington Post article urged, “As many Germans as possible should be 
won away from Nazi ideas and converted to those of democracy. The psychological and 
ideological battle which totalitarianism has long waged against democracy is still going on, in 
the prison camps on American soil. Unfortunately, for the moment, only one side is fighting 
it.”25 A New York Times article published in February 1944 said, “Already the Nazis are 
organized in the prisoner of war camps throughout America. Any German prisoner of war who 
shows any interest in democracy or America will be punished by his fellow prisoner. Five 
German prisoners have been murdered by their colleagues already…the Nazis in our prisons 
even have organized Gestapo units.” The only answer to the problem, according to the article’s 
author, was a program of re-education.26  
Aside from concerns about ideology and Nazi violence in prison camps, some Americans 
perceived that German soldiers were themselves victims of Hitler’s tyranny. Many had been 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 World War II, a Brief History, Office of the Provost Marshal General, p. 589. 
24 Bondy, Curt. "Observation and Reeducation of German Prisoners of War." Harvard Educational Review 14 
(January 1944), p. 15. 
25 Nazi Prisoners of War, p. 193. References a Washington Post article by Paul Winkler, “Reeducating Germans,” 
July 10 1944. 
26 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p. 15. 
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drafted and pulled into the war against their will. Unlike their so-called fanatical Japanese 
counterparts, Americans did not believe that German POWs should bear full responsibility for 
their deeds, no matter however contemptible their wartime actions might have been.27  Professor 
T.V. Smith, recalled in an article for the Saturday Review of Literature:  
These prisoners, though Germans, were not Nazis. Of course no German is a Nazi, not 
now that the vile business has rotted; but these prisoners were never Nazis. Not if our 
circumspection had half its presumed strength; for we had shifted their records back and forth for 
many an hour, interviewing them personally and resorting upon occasion to the scientific lie-
detector, to make certain that these men were what they claimed to be. Many of them, it appeared, 
had risked more and suffered more in risk against that wrong than had I.28 
 
There was a certain amount of sympathy felt towards Germans on the part of Americans, 
who identified with their struggles and wanted them kindly treated. A September 1944 article 
reported an incident at Fort Riley, Kansas, where “local citizens had complained that farmers’ 
wives mended prisoners’ clothing, and made them cakes or cookies for work well done. The 
climax came yesterday when several women unloaded carloads of prisoners at a branch camp 
here, following a day of work on nearby farms. One woman drove up with a prisoner holding a 
child on his lap.”29 This was considered a breach of protocol by the camp commander. 
It was not just the American public who entertained the idea of a re-education program. 
Originally, the concept of POW re-education was rejected by the Roosevelt administration and 
the Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, who viewed the prospect as 
unnecessary and a waste of Provost Marshal General funds.30 However, the government’s lack of 
response to calls for action led columnist Dorothy Thompson and Dorothy Bromley of the New 
York Herald to take the problem directly to Eleanor Roosevelt, who became concerned and 
                                                          
27 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 8. 
28 Smith, T.V. "Behind the Barbed Wire." The Saturday Review of Literature, May 4, 1946, p. 5. 
29 "Nazi Prisoner Coddling Halted By Commander." The Daily Times (Salisbury, MD), September 21, 1944.  
30 Robin, Ron Theodore. The Barbed-wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States during World 
War II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 18 and 21-23. 
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brought the matter directly to the president.31 President Roosevelt, in turn, discussed the matter 
with the secretaries of the War and State Departments, who also had growing concerns that “the 
punitive approach to Germany was not accompanied by positive reinforcement, or a 
rehabilitation program.”32 Historian Ron Robin noted that up until this point, “the war effort had 
been concentrated on devising a harsh negative strategy of dismemberment, destruction, and 
forced de-Nazification; but it was soon realized that alternatives had to be presented lest 
Germans seek comfort in other totalitarian doctrines.”33   
By 1944, it had become increasingly obvious to the government that the several hundred 
thousand German soldiers currently in U.S. custody would be repatriated at the end of the war to 
rejoin the German people with whom the U.S. government and the United Nations would have to 
deal for years to come. A letter from the Adjutant General, dated November 9, 1944, stated:  
 
The detention in the United States of ever increasing numbers of German prisoners of 
war creates an unprecedented opportunity. These men will someday be repatriated, and as a 
group, will have a powerful voice in future German affairs. Their opinions and feelings 
concerning America may determine, in a large measure, future relations between Germany and 
the United States.34 
 
An irresistible opportunity emerged to teach prisoners respect for American ideals, 
democracy, and especially for American institutions which might “provide a nucleus of 
democratically-inclined men in post-war Germany who could influence their country towards 
peaceful democratic solutions in the future.”35 A re-education program was an opportunity for 
the U.S. government to mitigate the risk that Germans would be swayed against the American 
                                                          
31 Fielder, The Enemy among Us, p. 44. 
32 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 24. 
33 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 24. 
34 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
35 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p. 4. 
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side of the two great-power system at the end of the war.36  In his book, The Barbed-wire 
College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States during World War II, Ron Robin well 
states: 
Driven by a mixture of evangelism and power politics, altruism and imperialism, a series of 
privately endowed yet government-sanctioned American colleges sprang up in various corners of 
the globe ranging from Egypt to India. These educational institutions symbolized what the 
American political establishment viewed as the fundamental difference between American 
expansionism and old-world imperialism. Americans sought to enlighten rather than conquer, 
persuade rather than subdue. Even though the government endorsement of international education 
was never more than a token reminder of American aspirations, it reflected a widely held 
assumption that moral influences and persuasion could eliminate the need for naked power in the 
management of global affairs.37 
 
Camp Concordia’s POW internment on U.S. soil was an opportunity for America to accomplish 
this task right in its own backyard.  
Beyond simply believing that such a program would be beneficial, the U.S. government 
also believed success was possible in the case of the German POWs. A War Department booklet 
published for supervisors of German POW laborers suggested that German political deviancy 
was not the result of irredeemable personality or racial defects, as was the perceived case with 
the Japanese POWs. Presented with American values, it was the popular consensus that German 
POWs could conceivably be transformed “from adversaries to disciples.”38   
And so, early in 1944, representatives of the War Department and the State Department 
agreed  to take  discrete measures toward establishing an understanding of and sympathy for 
American traditions, institutions, and ways of life and thought among German POWs.39 With the 
support of the new Provost Marshal General, Major General Archer Lerch, the idea for a re-
education program gained the traction it needed. Intentionally ambiguous in name, the Special 
                                                          
36 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
37 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 17. 
38 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 8. 
39 World War II, a Brief History, Office of the Provost Marshal General, p. 544. 
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Projects Division (SPD), was officially established on September 6, 1944 and began as a covert 
effort. This was partially to avoid being perceived as a blatant attempt at imposing propaganda 
on prisoners, and partly to guard against the rejection of the program by the POWs themselves, 
who would surely object to any obvious attempt to reshape their political beliefs.40 
 To support the program, re-education proponents pointed to Article 17 of the Geneva 
Conventions.  This article specified that “belligerents shall encourage as much as possible the 
organization of intellectual and sporting pursuits by the prisoners of war.” The vagueness of the 
article left much room for interpretation. The basic premise was that instead of discrediting 
National Socialism, American authorities should simply foster respect for the American 
alternative. Program staff were warned in a secret memorandum that the plan was not to be 
“overdone;” POWs were meant to be “democratized” but not “Americanized”.41  
The SPD administrators decided that if selected materials for intellectual diversion were 
made available to the camps, the curiosity of the prisoners concerning the U.S. and its 
institutions would provide the primary means for their education.42 A letter from the Adjutant 
General specified that the purpose of the program was to “create and foster spontaneous 
responses on the part of the German prisoners of war towards activities and contacts which will 
encourage an attitude of respect on their part for American institutions, traditions, and ways of 
life and thought.” In short, the program was designed to encourage self-indoctrination.43  
                                                          
40 Ibid. The program was initially classified secret because Germany might intentionally misunderstand its scope as 
a pretext for severe retaliation against American prisoners of war. Army leadership considered it undesirable to give 
the German prisoners of war any knowledge of such a program at a time when Nazi elements in the camps had 
sufficient power to sabotage the War Department’s efforts. 
41 Krammer, Nazi Prisoners of War in America. 303. Endnote references “Memorandum on Reorientation of 
German Prisoners of War, Secret, typewritten, n.d. Farrand Collection, Hoover Institution.  
42 World War II, a Brief History, Office of the Provost Marshal General, p. 544. 
43 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
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A critical component of the re-education plan was the “Idea Factory,” first located at 
Camp Van Etten, New York and later Fort Kearney, Rhode Island, where carefully screened 
German POW assistants worked with a cadre of university professors to complete much of the 
central work of the SPD. This group was responsible for writing and editing a POW newspaper, 
reviewing books for prison libraries, translating program aids and reading materials, and 
monitoring the sentiments of their peers.44 A series of paper-bound books comprised of reprints 
of classic German literature, including authors who had been banned in Germany, were also 
made available to prisoners through POW canteens. The curriculum approved and distributed by 
the Idea Factory was never intended to be forced upon the prisoners. Rather, it was made 
available through literature, motion pictures, newspapers, music, art, and educational courses.  
Additionally, the American Council on Education was asked to select colleges and 
universities in assisting with the program. In the summer of 1944 these universities began to 
support the re-education programs by making available books, educational films, slides and other 
training aids, and by offering advice in the choice of textbooks and in the organization of 
courses. These institutions varied from the largest national universities down to junior colleges. 
Fourteen universities were selected to provide correspondence courses for prisoners.45 
In order to facilitate the programs at individual camps, the SPD set up nine service 
commands across the U.S., each administered by a field grade officer. A company grade officer, 
designated the Assistant Executive Officer (AEO), was assigned to each camp locally to oversee 
the individual programs.46 Initially the SPD attempted to fill these AEO jobs with 150 personnel 
possessing a specific set of criteria, but failed when they discovered that intelligence agencies 
                                                          
44 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 60. 
45 World War II, a Brief History, Office of the Provost Marshal General, p. 564. 
46 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p. 23. 
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had already absorbed many of the German-speaking officers. Therefore, instead of handpicking 
officers to become AEOs, the major commands were instructed to fill quotas, with German 
language skills listed as a preference rather than a prerequisite. Officers were vetted and sent to a 
series of training conferences.47 
These AEOs were critical to the SPD’s plan because they were charged with 
administering the program at the local camp level, monitoring the response of the prisoners, and 
diffusing tensions between the “military-minded” commanders and the “intellectual-minded” 
SPD. The architects of the program anticipated the suspicion and resistance the program would 
arouse among POW camp commanders, many of whom feared that re-education would erode 
discipline or foster strife among inmates. The SPD hoped the presence of a re-education 
coordinator would mitigate such fears and protect its investments.48 
On December 2, 1944, Captain Carl. C. Teufel arrived at Camp Concordia as the SPD-
designated AEO.  Teufel reported to the camp’s commander, Lt. Col. Eggerss, the details of his 
mission, including the direction of a prisoner of war school, a motion-picture program, 
encouragement of the use of radios, musical activities, hobbies, physical recreation, dramatics, 
libraries, the establishment of a prisoner of war camp newspaper, the orientation of American 
personnel, and other functions of a more minor character. 
Cpt. Teufel was met with an unexpected yet pleasant surprise: there was already an 
education program, entirely independent of the SPD directed re-education program, which 
existed at Concordia. In his initial report, Cpt. Teufel remarked that “Probably no other camp in 
the country was so well organized for such work. Colonel Eggerss had long favored keeping the 
minds and bodies of his wards occupied, not only for reasons of security, but also in order to 
                                                          
47 Speakman. Re-education of German Prisoners, p. 24. Training conferences were held at Ft. Slocom, NY. 
48 Robin, The Barbed-wire College, p. 55. 
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develop their capabilities for later civil life.” 49 The morale at Concordia was described as 
exceptionally high, relatively speaking, largely because the prisoners were permitted from the 
very beginning to establish ways and means of amusing themselves as well as to train themselves 
academically for the future.50 This attitude had resulted not only in an education program, but in 
a large-scale prisoner of war university. 
The school at Concordia had, in fact, begun in the fall of 1943, very soon after 
activation.51 Although early education programs existed at other POW camps, it appears that 
their programs consisted primarily of obligatory re-education lectures. The fact that the post-
secondary school at Concordia was not only voluntary, but self-initiated by the German POWs 
themselves, made the program unique.52 The German POW population at Concordia, like at most 
POW camps, was largely comprised of young men whose college education had been interrupted 
by the war, and many of them wished to resume it as soon as possible.53   
Another influential, unique reason for the initiation of the program was the fact that 
Concordia’s population, with its heavy preponderance of officer-prisoners was 
disproportionately well-educated compared to other camps. Cpt. Teufel noted in his report upon 
arrival at Concordia, 
Anti-Nazis in enlisted men’s camps were proverbially known to the CMP (Corps 
of Military Police) as weak characters, but this group of officer anti-Nazis was composed 
of extraordinary men. Two of them had travelled extensively and studied in the United 
States. All were highly educated, lawyers, teachers, ministers, and similar types of 
professions which are the more susceptible to the mental training leading toward 
objectivity. As true Germans, their aim was to assist in every possible way in the 
respectable regeneration of their fatherland through the destruction of National Socialism. 
                                                          
49 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Curriculum of the Prisoner of War Camp, Concordia, Kansas. MS, RH MS 240, Spencer Library, Kansas 
University. 




A bit fearfully at first, and always secretly, they began to give active assistance to the 
Assistant Executive Officer.54 
 
These educated Germans organized the school at Concordia themselves, and independently 
selected curriculum that was found by SPD representatives to have thirty percent re-education 
value.55 These efforts were pursued so diligently that they succeeded despite ever-present Nazi 
intimidation. Germans were responsible for volunteering to teach, volunteering to be taught, and 
requesting materials be available to them to accomplish those objectives.56 Classes were taught 
by “whoever believed knew so much about a field, knowledge to lecture at a university level, 
practice or work related, that he could pass the knowledge on to others.”57 There were 
approximately 175 instructors, including fifty with doctoral degrees and many others with 
comparable educational attainments.58 The curriculum they taught at Concordia included 
approximately 300 subjects, including English, twelve additional languages, electronics, 
theology, history, geography, government, engineering, medicine, arts, sciences, and vocational 
subjects. Within a very short time after their arrival, prisoners had constructed an open-air stage 
and a great deal of time was dedicated to music, the arts, and theater. 
 
                                                          
54 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Edwards, “Inspection Report.” Germans POWs frequently even purchased books with their own money. 
57 Wahl, “Camp Concordia Prisoner of War University.” Np. 




German POWs from the 47th Grenadier Band, one many such leisure activities establish by and for the 
POWs at Concordia. 
 
Once the program began to gain traction, the purchase of teaching materials, textbooks, 
charts, films, etc. were made on behalf of the German Red Cross, the International Red Cross, 
and the War Prisoners’ Aid of the Y.M.C.A.  These materials combined to form a scientific 
library containing more than 7,000 books covering practically all fields of knowledge.59  
With the authorization of the War Department and in cooperation with the German Red 
Cross, the Camp Concordia school furthered its legitimacy by creating a partnership with the 
University of Kansas. Fred S. Montgomery, director of the Kansas University Extension Bureau, 
was named Education Director for Camp Concordia in 1943.60 By early 1944, the Third Reich’s 
Ministry of Education had approved the university concept and fifteen German and Austrian 
universities agreed to honor any courses successfully completed by the POWs, an agreement 
                                                          
59 Teufel, History of Camp Concordia. Np. 
60 Wahl, “Camp Concordia Prisoner of War University.” 
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which they honored at the completion of the war.61 The prisoner-instructors would draw up 
proposed syllabi for their courses and submit them to Kansas University (KU), where they would 
be reviewed and accepted by the appropriate department head. Robert McNair Davis, Dean of 
the School of Law at KU during the war years, evaluated the proposed coursework for several 
classes offered in the 4th, 5th and 6th semesters62 of the University under the law school as 
follows: 
 Commerce and Trade: Total 70 hours. In America comparable courses are given in 
schools of business. Only small portions of this subject matter are offered in American 
Law Schools. This seems very thorough and fully adequate. 
 Customs Law: Total 62 Hours. In America would be classed under Economics or 
Business. This seems to be a very elaborate and thorough course – American Law 
Schools offer nothing of this kind.  
 Criminal Procedure in Taxation: 20 Hours. Nothing comparable to these courses in 
American Universities so far as I know. Seem very elaborate probably ok in the German 
procedure.63 
 
Prior to the departure of the main body of officer prisoners in September 1945, students with 
adequate academic attainment were given a certificate bearing the University of Kansas seal and 
signatures from some of its officials.64 
When Cpt. Teufel first arrived at Concordia, he concurred with the SPD that all re-education 
activities would need to be undertaken with subtlety. This was because he himself was the 
subject of considerable suspicion by all prisoners, and also because any open efforts to control 
educational measures in the direction of re-education would only result in resistance and even 
possible danger to those who wished to cooperate. He cautiously sought to gain the confidence of 
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62 Although called semesters, the Concordia University’s academic year was actually divided up into trimesters. The 
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the prisoners and identify those with whom he could cooperate.  Cpt. Teufel recounted in his 
report that he began to “control by surreptitious means the essential media of his program 
through the careful cooperation of a small but long-standing group of anti-Nazis with whom a 
high degree of mutual confidence quickly sprang up.” 65 
As it became more and more clear that Germany would likely lose the war, the intimidation 
tactics employed by the Nazi group became more aggressive. A memo from the Lt. Col. Eggerss 
to the Provost Marshal General’s Office on March 6, 1945 identifying known anti-Nazi allies 
stated: 
Complete confidence is felt for the altruism and ability of these two officers. A lesser confidence 
is felt in the following officers, with whom personal relations have been less close. All others on the 
list are not personally known to the Commanding Officer at this camp.  The security of these men has 
made it necessary that personal contact be maintained only through those who have official capacities 
which make them innocently accessible for contacts. Any efforts to personally appraise these others 
could well place their lives in jeopardy, unless attempted on other premises.66 
 
Had the cooperation of these men been discovered by their Nazi counterparts, it was a very 
real possibility that their lives would have been at risk. It was determined that in order for an 
outright re-education program to be successful, the committed Nazi POWs would need to be 
removed from the compound.67 Cpt. Teufel’s circle of anti-Nazi allies assisted the Camp 
leadership by divulging the thoughts and activities of the other POWs on the compound, and by 
monitoring the Nazis on behalf of the American authorities. This assisted the camp authorities in 
finding those POWs to be transferred. As a result, more than 100 of the most dedicated SS 
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leaders were removed to a secure camp at Alva, Oklahoma in the spring of 1945.68 With their 
departure, it was possible to begin a planned and open program of re-education.69 
Following V-E Day, the War Department called for the departure of all military personnel 
from the camps by March of 1946. In preparation for the imminent repatriation of the POWs, the 
SPD intensified the revision of their syllabi, timetables, and objectives to devise a new and 
bolder course for the program.70 The total German defeat, which dissipated the dangers of 
potential German retribution for perceived indoctrination of propaganda, meant the re-education 
program could now be declassified, and on May 28, 1945 the Provost Marshal General released 
its story to the press.71 
On July 7, 1945, after nearly two years and six semesters of courses, the university at Camp 
Concordia was discontinued.  Previously offered upper division courses covering a wide range of 
topics were replaced by a reduced curriculum dedicated to the teaching of English, American 
History, geography, and civics.72 The aim of this highly focused new re-education program was 
to win the prisoners over to a more democratic paradigm and to help them recognize, through 
their own efforts, the depths to which Nationalist Socialistic doctrine had crippled Germany.73 
This crash course in American democracy was intended to influence post war German society by 
sending program graduates back to Germany ahead of the remaining POWs to help rebuild their 
war-torn nation.74 
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It is impossible to measure the effects on either the POWs or their home country of 
Concordia’s Prisoner of War University and re-education programs, however there are several 
strong indicators of their success. Between January and August of 1945, school participation 
ranged between sixty-four and eighty-seven percent. During the final stages of the new re-
education program initiated in the summer of 1945, which remained voluntary, the campus 
experienced eighty-eight percent participation.75 In the span of those final few months, the 
POWs’ ability to read and understand English increased from approximately fifty-five percent 
for officers and one percent for enlisted men to approximately seventy-five percent fluency and 
twelve percent, respectively.76 According to Cpt.Teufel, other indications of success included: 
 The frank request of the senior German spokesman for guidance in the re-orientation of the 
younger and more totalitarian-oriented  members of the camp 
 Voluntary purchase of somewhere between 6000 and 8000 books for re-educational purposes, in 
addition to between 15000 and 18000 of this type already in possession77  
 The initiation of a series of lectures on re-educational subjects by the Assistant Executive Officer, 
the Provost Marshal, and the Post Exchange Officer, at the request of the Germans 
 Articles composed for the camp newspaper by the Assistant Executive Officer at the request of 
the Germans 
 The issuance of more than 4000 certificates of credit to POWs for participation in re-education at 
the urgent request of the Germans78 
 
Cpt. Teufel concluded in his report that he believed the programs had encouraged positive 
change and wrote, “Many…indications of a psychological transformation could be evoked, but 
space does not permit it. It is sufficient to state that as a result of spontaneous responses on the 
part of the German prisoners of war and through their own self-indoctrination, Nazism faded out 
and a growing confidence in America and the democratic way of life began to replace it.”79 
Ultimately, as Cpt. Teufel reports, this was the real explanation for Concordia’s successful 
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program: “Re-education was accomplished through natural means from within, by and for 
Germans, and as it is felt it will have to be done in Germany. The Assistant Executive Officer 
merely attempted to guide and advise a German-inspired mental movement.”80 
The story of the re-education programs at Camp Concordia, and at German prisoner of war 
camps throughout the country, is a little-known slice of American history. Both the conditions at 
Concordia and the extent to which the re-education program was carried out was radically 
different from anything experienced by other demographics of prisoners. Although prisoners 
were originally intended to be used only as supplemental labor, the U.S. government, with the 
prodding of the American public, was quick to realize the full potential of the situation. The 
institution of the Special Projects Division and subsequent initiation of re-education programs 
across the country was a massive undertaking and far exceeded the Geneva Conventions’ 
stipulations of encouraging the intellectual pursuits of the prisoners. This was ultimately the case 
because of the United States’ belief in the re-educational potential of the German prisoners and 
by its increasing interest in participating in the shaping post-war Germany. While the full effects 
of the re-education programs at Concordia and other POW camps throughout the nation are 
impossible to measure, it is certain that the United States’ attempted re-education of German 
combatants was felt for many years.  
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